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SELF-OWNERSHIP AND THE POLITICAL
THEORY OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON
by Elizabeth B. Clark*
The emphasis on freedom or enslavement of the body, and the is-
sues that sprang from that focus, were feminists' contribution to nine-
teenth-century American liberalism, as well as their link to radical
thought. Elizabeth Cady Stanton drew arguments from the realm of
political liberty and religious tolerance to make the case for choice in
private life. But the vision of individual autonomy in sexual and domes-
tic matters served also as the basis for her definition of citizenship and
as a paradigm for relations among citizens and between citizens and
the state. Self-ownership was the unifying theme that ran through
Stanton's political development; it described for her the only appropri-
ate relationship between any individual and her family, community,
government, or God.
The nineteenth century saw the transformation of liberalism by
feminism and by women's entry into the public sphere. Liberal
women's claims to liberty, equality, and natural rights employed the
language of the Founding Fathers, but their content was quite differ-
ent.1 Women's formulations of their own rights were not echoes of the
eighteenth century; their definition of liberty was more personal than
that of the Founders. Liberal women supported civil rights, but the
feminist positions that roused the most passion tended to be the claims
for bodily control, which drew upon, but did not always acknowledge,
the radical utopian and free love agenda. Challenges to the double
standard, age of consent laws, and the husband's right to administer
* Assistant Professor of Law at University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.A., J.D., University
of Michigan; Ph.D, Princeton University.
Please note: An asterisk after a source indicates that the Connecticut Law Review was unable
to check the source.
1. See I- DuBois. FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE. THE EsSERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENr WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869 (1978); A. KRADITOR. THE IDEAS OF ThiE VOMAN SUFFRAGE
MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1965). Both take the approach that feminist claims were essentially repli-
cations of revolutionary republican rhetoric.
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corporal punishment, as well as the advocacy of the right to voluntary
motherhood, freedom in conjugal relations, divorce, custody of children,
and writs of habeas corpus for married women against their hus-
bands-all of these issues became incorporated into public political de-
bate and significantly expanded the limits of potential liberal per-
sonhood. With the exception of divorce, liberal women agreed on these
claims, and they became a part of the feminist agenda early on.
This is not to say that liberal feminists rejected classic liberalism.
National Woman Suffrage Association (the "NWSA") members in the
post-war period espoused traditional liberal positions on free trade, cur-
rency, the primacy of contract, and freedom of religious thought. Mem-
bers generally supported deregulatory positions while emphasizing indi-
vidual liberties. The campaign for married women's property reform
fit easily into the liberal mold as well, creating a liberal legal personal-
ity who expressed herself through the control of and the contracting for
goods and services, turning a "femme covert into a living, breathing
woman-a wife into a property-holder, who can make contracts, buy
and sell."' Claims for employment and equal pay, although not pursued
in the post-war period with the vigor of other issues, sprang out of the
growing equality rhetoric that stressed the right to support oneself as a
part of the liberal scheme. The franchise itself was the mark of a lib-
eral individual.
But feminism's contribution to liberalism was to reinforce and
greatly expand the individual's zone of privacy-to widen the definition
of rights beyond the rights of the individual in his civil status to include
the rights of the individual in her private capacity. The intellectual
genesis of these positions is most easily traced in the writings of Eliza-
beth Cady Stanton.4
Stanton cast the traditional family, the church, and the state as
2. A good representative sample of this writing can be found in the newspaper the Revolution
in the years Stanton and Anthony edited it (1868-1870).
3. Letter from Elizabeth C. Stanton to Gerrit Smith (n.d.), collected in Stanton Papers (two-
reel set of letters and essays available at Douglass College of Rutgers University).
4. See, e.g., ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, SUSAN B. ANTHONY: CORRESPONDENCE, WRITINGS,
SPEECHES (E. DuBois ed. 1981) [hereinafter STANTON & ANTHONY].
This focus raises the problem of Stanton's representativeness within the movement. I am
writing here about Stanton, but have tried at the same time to make clear that, although her ideas
were always more developed and usually more radical than her co-workers in the NWSA, there
were large areas of agreement, and Stanton's opinions in their own right were highly influential
even where there was disagreement. Stanton did serve repeatedly as president and officer of the
NWSA; her views were not so far outside the mainstream as to alienate large numbers of the
group's voting constituency, at least as long as the NWSA remained a separate organization.
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the three interrelated structures that kept women in the position of
bond-servants and prevented their growth and development outside
stultifying traditional roles. The Founding Fathers took a definite step
in the right direction by abolishing the power of monarchy in favor of
government by the people. But they left intact two intermediate struc-
tures of authority, the hierarchies of family and church, and so "fast-
ened their broken chains on all they considered inferior to themselves
and incapable of resistance." 5 Antebellum "government by the people"
brought self-government to representatives of groups rather than to in-
dividuals; Stanton argued that, "[t]o build a true republic, the church
and the home must undergo the same upheavings we now see in the
State."' For Stanton, the move she made in the 1870s away from polit-
ical analysis and toward exploring inequity in the home and later in the
church was a move toward understanding and destroying the deep
structure of political inequality.7
To do so, Stanton set out to undermine traditional sources of com-
munal and familial authority. A letter from a reader of the Revolution
asked if the family didn't need a ruling head to prevent anarchy.8 Stan-
ton's reply lumped fathers with kings and with popes, as despots to be
overturned by the emerging individual in the full exercise of her rights.
The representative theory of the family-whereby women were to be
represented in the public arena by their husbands and fathers-worked
no better for Stanton than the representative theory of government had
worked for eighteenth-century revolutionaries. She explicitly denied
that the family was a sub-unit or "governing power" in the state,
charging governments instead to deal with individuals directly: "The
law takes cognizance of family relations only as they are brought to its
notice."9 The patriarch was to be stripped of his power in the home,
and adult individuals were to return to full autonomy, thereby perfectly
fulfilling the promise of the American Revolution and bringing per-
sonal liberty back to the most immediate level.
5. Stanton, Self-Government 7-8 (ca. 1874), collected in Stanton Papers (Reel 4) (fivc-reel set
of speeches, articles, notes, and correspondence available at the Library of Congress).
6. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 152 (E.C. Stanton, S.B. Anthony & MJ. Gage eds.
1882).
7. Within the movement she succeeded to a remarkable extent in fusing the issues; the theo-
retical question was often conceived as "Woman in the Home the Church, and the State," the
title of a talk given by Laura Cuppy Smith through the American Literary Bureau, as advertised
in 3 Woodhull & Claflin's Weekly 14 (Oct. 14, 1871) (Issue 22).
8. 5 Revolution 152 (Mar. 10, 1870) (Issue 10).
9. Id.
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This agenda created a strong tension between public and private,
which has dogged the women's movement ever since. As issues of do-
mestic governance moved outside the "privacy" of the home-often a
euphemism for unchecked abuse of male authority 10-they necessarily
became "public" in the broadest sense; these issues were talked, writ-
ten, and read about in the dominant forums of the day. In the process
of women's integration into the political realm-a fait accompli well
before the nineteenth amendment-women firmly nailed such formerly
"private" areas as family law jurisdiction, separation and divorce, bod-
ily autonomy, and the abolition of the sexual double standard to the
platform of liberalism. Not everyone who styled themselves "liberal"
agreed on the details, but there was a growing consensus that such is-
sues were appropriately handled in the realm of politics, rather than by
private authority."
10. On receiving complaints that the Revolution was using newsgirls to sell their papers to the
public, Stanton replied that they were better off in the public street than in the "sacred privacy of
the home" where they were at the mercy of any drunken brute. 2 Revolution 37 (July 23, 1868)
(Issue 3).
11. Stanton's sense, dating from the antebellum years, that private authority (church and pa-
triarchy) was responsible for the regulation of sexual and family life may have been at odds with
the history of local governance, although this does not make it any less real a force in her think-
ing. William E. Nelson suggests in THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT
OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975) that, at least in the North,
the discovery and punishment of moral crimes was the primary responsibility of the judicial sys-
tem until the time of the Revolution; then the focus on morality gave way to concern for crimes
against property. However, the close identification in revolutionary New England between church
and state justifies Stanton's assumptions. Also, moral crimes usually involved acts outside mar-
riage; even in colonial New England, Stanton is correct that intrafamily disputes were often left to
the discretion of the father. She sought to have this paternal power voided, thereby destroying the
distinction between the married and the unmarried, which for purposes of jurisdiction is still very
important in family law today, as is the distinction between acts done within the context of an
ongoing family relationship and acts done outside of, or at the end of, an ongoing family
relationship.
In addition, Stanton was deeply concerned with the separation of the two branches of author-
ity, church and state, and was committed to describing a neutral central authority that could take
over from the church.
It is questionable whether either patriarchy or the church ruled as forcefully by Stanton's day
as she suggests, or whether she was beating a dead horse. I think she was beating a sick horse.
Both pure patriarchy and pure Calvinism were already well in decline by the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, with Stanton enthusiastically preparing to pound in the coffin nails. See A. DOUGLAS, TiE
FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE (1977); J. FLIEGELMAN, PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS: THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY, 1750-1800 (1982); M. GROSSBERO.
GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1985); Cf.
Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority,
26 J. FAM. L. 741 (1988) (on the continuing vitality of religious authority). Stanton certainly
understood the dangers and possible costs of enhancing judicial or legislative jurisdiction over
private behavior, even to spite the church. In fact, probably in large part because of the weakening
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At the same time, feminists sought to bring these issues to the
attention of the public and within the legal jurisdiction of a liberal
state. Their explicit purpose was to assert that decisions about marital
and domestic matters were highly personal and subject only to individ-
ual jurisdiction. 2 The Revolution reader was right in marking that the
father's fall as head of household left a vacuum of authority. Stanton's
work sought to put the individual into the position of ultimate author-
ity, a configuration that made it difficult for her to develop any coher-
ent model of the state, or any notion of the public interest.
I. SELF-OWNERSHIP WITHIN THE FAMILY
The right to control one's body was the preeminent personal and
political right for Stanton from a very early age. In her autobiographi-
cal writings, she portrays herself as a rebel from birth. Even accounting
for the later gloss on the facts, she seems to have been a strong-willed
girl, confident in her opinions, traits she retained all her life."3 Her ac-
count of her childhood is one of ongoing resistance to a strictly ortho-
dox upbringing designed to intimidate with godly fear. She was fre-
quently punished for tantrums, which, with hindsight, she
characterized as "justifiable acts of rebellion against the tyranny of
those in authority.' 14
Stanton despised the morbid Presbyterian regime that she grew up
of "private" authorities, government intervention in the family seemed to be on the rise in the
nineteenth century, despite the new characterization of the family as "private," a result Stanton
would have hated. See Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L REv. 1135,
1146. Thanks to Dirk Hartog for talking this over with me.
12. I don't mean to suggest that this interpretation-individual sovereignty over issues of fam-
ily governance-became the dominant one. Michael Grossberg's Governing the Hearth is convinc-
ingly devoted to showing the development of a "judicial patriarchy" composed of judges who
substituted their own decisions on family disputes for those of the father and clearly felt it their
business to do so. See M. GROSSBERG, supra note 11. Liberal feminists themselves were more
likely to admit judicial or state intervention when the dispute involved the custody of children than
when it concerned regulating the status of married adults. See Letter from Elizabeth C. Stanton
to E.L. Godkin (Jan. 1, 1898), collected in Stanton Papers, supra note 3. The tone of this letter is
quite uncharacteristic of Stanton; she softened in her attitude toward the state in the last years of
her life.
13. As she reports in her autobiography, "I was always courageous in saying what I saw to be
true, for the single reason that I never dreamed of opposition. What seemed to me to be right I
thought must be equally plain to all other rational beings." 2. STANTON. EiGHTY YEARS AND
MORE: REMINISCENCES 1815-1897, at 216 (1898 & reprint 1971).
14. Id. at 12. Eighty Years contains the most complete autobiographical account. See also 2.
GRIFFITH, IN HER OWN RIGHT: THE LtFE OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON (1984). On Stanton's
rebelliousness, see also Gail Parker's introduction to E. STANTON, supra note 13, at xviii-xx (re-
print 1971).
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under, which tried to keep children "embalmed as mummies." 15 She
instinctively disliked Calvinism's strict and gloomy passivity, and soon
bolstered her dislike with intellectual arguments. While at school in her
teens, Stanton sat under the preaching of Charles Finney,"8 and tempo-
rarily fell prey to the sleeplessness and morbid terrors of the fearful
unconverted. After a bad bout of nerves, she was rescued by her
brother-in-law, who whisked her off to a spa for a spell of reading in
liberal theology. Its "rational ideas based on scientific facts" helped to
set her free from "the old bondage of fear of the visible and the invisi-
ble . . . and, no longer subject to absolute authority, [she] rejoiced in
the dawn of a new day of freedom in thought and action. 11 This epi-
sode fueled Stanton's dislike of religious orthodoxy and impressed on
her the need to fight enslavement in all of its guises, although despite
her vehement anti-clericalism she never entirely erased the idea of God
from her mind.
With seven children, an absentee husband, and sporadic household
help, Stanton spent a great deal of time being a mother. Unlike the
evangelical feminists, she made little attempt to use motherhood as a
platform for political participation. Her views on the parent's role and
the nature of child-raising, nonetheless, shed light on her notion of rela-
tions between citizens and the state.
Stanton's carefully constructed character as a mother seems a lit-
tle too large for life.18 As with all she undertook, Stanton threw herself
into domestic life, and, at least early on, took a great deal of pleasure
in developing her own domestic skills and running her own household.
Pride in her competence and skills moved her to master domestic arts
not perhaps of much intrinsic interest to her; and child-bearing and
raising offered a splendid opportunity to pit her wits against male pro-
fessionals. Refusing to trust doctors' advice (which she said was as
"confusing and unsatisfactory as the longer and shorter catechisms and
the Thirty-nine Articles") 9 or the accepted wisdom of the day on the
care of infants, she substituted her own judgment and instituted a re-
15. E. STANTON, supra note 13, at 12.
16. Charles Finney (1792-1875) was a theologian and revivalist who helped spark the Second
Great Awakening in the first decades of the nineteenth century; his theology rejected predetermi-
nation of will and stressed instead "means" or individual efforts to seek moral perfection.
17. E. STANTON, supra note 13, at 44-45.
18. Elisabeth Griffith arrives at this conclusion as well in In Her Own Right. See E. GRIFFITH,
supra note 14, at xvii, xix. She cites one of Stanton's contemporaries who charged that Stanton
had "secured much immunity by a comfortable look of motherliness." Id. at 196.
19. E. STANTON, supra note 13, at 114.
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gime for her children based on her most dearly held principles. Swad-
dling, bandaging, binding, closed windows, any kind of restrictive prac-
tices were out; her children were unbound, thrust into the fresh air,
allowed to eat and sleep as they demanded. "Show me a child that is
snubbed, cribbed, crippled, thwarted in every way and I will show you
incapacity, weakness, disease, misery."' 0 Stanton took enormous pride
in her self-taught expertise and, in later years, claimed that, on her
many cross-country trips, she "was of great use to the traveling pub-
lic."2 Seizing bundled and crying children from startled mothers,
Stanton would rip off their wraps and hang them out the window, ex-
pounding on the virtues of free movement and fresh air; many babies,
she suggested, were "emancipated" through her ministries.22
At the same time, the role of the mother as idealized in the domi-
nant culture, as well as the resulting loss of autonomy motherhood nec-
essarily entails, troubled Stanton. Few nineteenth-century American
women could have been as wonderfully unsentimental as Stanton; in
quoting Matilda Gage's favorite motto, she dismissed in one master
stroke all of the favorite sentimental symbols of the day-"[t] here is a
word sweeter than Mother, Home, or Heaven-that word is Liberty." 23
Unlike the home as it functioned for evangelical feminists, the house in
Stanton's ideology was not a sanctuary surrounded by protective mater-
nal love; such an image confirmed most of the things she hated about
the traditional family.24 Stanton herself-again, unlike many of the
evangelicals-was not strongly mother-identified, and, in fact, seems to
have gotten on rather poorly with her own mother for most of her life.25
20. Stanton, supra note 5, at 24-25. So convinced was Stanton in her on powers that the
lesson she drew from childrearing was to trust "neither men nor books absolutely after this, either
in regard to the heavens above or the earth beneath, but [she] continue[d] to use [her] 'mother's
instinct, if 'reason' is too dignified a term to apply to woman's thoughts." E. STANTON, supra note
13, at 120.
21. E. STANTON. supra note 13, at 271.
22. Id. at 112, 271-72.
23. Id. at 328-29.
24. A part of her vehement feeling about cloying family life clearly came from her ot n do-
mestic frustrations. She laments that "I pace up and down these two chambers of mine like a
caged lioness, longing to bring to a close nursing and housekeeping cares." Letter from Elizabeth
C. Stanton to Susan B. Anthony (June 10. 1856). in 2 E. STANTON. Etuz Et CADY STANTON
AS REVEALED IN HER LETTERS, DIARY. AND REtINISCENcEs 66 (T. Stanton & HS. Blatch eds.
1922) [hereinafter LErTERS]; STANTON & ANTHONY, supra note 4, at 63: see also E. GFFTm.
supra note 14, at 79, 88.
25. In many ways, Stanton was not strongly woman-identified, either. Despite membership in
suffrage organizations, she hated the meetings, much preferring to be on her own lecturing in the
West. For Stanton, women in groups smacked of the neurotic, not the safe and loving. See E
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Whatever her personal feelings about motherhood-and they were
almost certainly mixed-maternity presented a troubling political prob-
lem for the women's movement. For men and women alike, motherhood
remained the best argument against suffrage, political participation,
and work outside the home. Stanton saw biological determinism-or
maternal fatalism-as an off-shoot of the Protestant church's teachings
on sex roles; in her articles and lectures, she struggled to convince
women that they were not doomed to a miserable maternity "through
that one fatal interview in the Garden of Eden."2 Stanton refuted the
"insulting assertion that a woman's physical sex constitutes her wo-
manhood.27 She considered motherhood simply an incident in the life
of an individual whose own conscience and moral faculties were
paramount.
The obsessive, hovering, maternal style in fashion in the dominant
culture was anathema to Stanton as well; she did not equate beneficent
authority, or even good care, with protectiveness. The ideal childhood
should be, as she believed her own had been, "one long struggle against
arbitrary power; one continual protest in favor of self-government."28
According to Stanton, rebellion against authority was the state of
nature.
Even children at the earliest age are always in a chronic con-
dition of rebellion against the control of nurses, older brothers
and sisters, parents and teachers, ever showing a decided pref-
erence to have their own way, in other words to govern them-
selves. Boys in schools and colleges find their chief happiness
in disobeying rules, circumventing and defying teachers and
professors with their youthful pranks; so many declarations of
independence affording one of the most pleasing topics of con-
versation in after life. The general unrest of the people under
kings, emperors and czars, in secret plottings or open defiance
against self constituted authority, shows the settled hatred of
all subjects, to any form of government to which they have
never consented.2 9
STANTON, supra note 13, at 40-41.
26. Stanton, Religion for Women and Children, collected in Stanton Papers, supra note 5
(Reel 2) (The Index 436 (Mar. 11, 1886)).
27. 1 Revolution 229 (Apr. 16, 1868) (Issue 15); see also 3 Revolution 148 (Mar. 11, 1869)
(Issue 10).
28. Stanton, supra note 5, at 24.
29. Stanton, Self-Government the Best Means of Self Development, in NATIONAL WOMAN
(Vol. 21:905
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Even the power to consent to a form of government did not satisfy
Stanton; she believed it her own prerogative, and any other child's or
adult's, to exercise a line item veto over any act of authority that
stunted or confined.
The fundamental governing principle of the liberal household re-
mained that for any one person to rule over any other person consti-
tuted despotism. Conservative defenders of the family often labeled its
gender roles "natural" or God-ordained. Echoing the abolitionist anar-
chists from the pre-war period, Stanton and others labeled such pre-
scriptions a usurpation of God's direct authority over the individual,
and demanded that the "self-constituted deputies of God Almighty
. . . either . . . relinquish their claims to divine authority, or . . .
produc[e] credentials from headquarters to that effect."30 God alone
could dictate the parts men and women played, and he employed no
intermediaries. 31 But how can one distinguish good authority from bad
authority in this context, particularly for children, where the case for
authority of some kind is the most compelling? The best regime, for
children and citizens both, was not absolute authority: no tyranny in
the home or in the state. Stanton finds that the training that is most
likely to produce the good citizen-which is after all the goal of school-
ing-is the rule that forces the students to rule themselves and that
presents both right and wrong to the student and "demands. . . an act
of judgment, a decision between the two." 32 Absolute authority, Stan-
ton admits, is more likely to produce order; but order is not the goal.
Rather, the goal is to teach children, not domination over others, but
SUFFRAGE ASS'N. REPORT OF THE 16TH ANNUAL WASINGTON CONVE oN . . 1884, at 62
(1884). There can be little doubt that Stanton practiced what she preached in raising her own
children; they were infamously ill-behaved, and Stanton seemed to get a great deal of pleasure out
of their scrapes once it became apparent that no one had actually been killed.
30. 1 Woodhull & Claflin's Weekly (Sept. 3, 1870) (Issue 17): see also Woodhull, A Speech
on the Principles of Social Freedom . . . November 20, 1871, in TIE VICTORIA WOODHULL
READER (M.B. Stern ed. 1974).
31. For the most part in Stanton's thinking this includes Christ as well. While approving or his
teachings as representing the true and uncorrupted Christianity, she never gives any indication
that she sees him as a deity, or a conduit to God. Unlike the evangelicals, for whom the suffering
and atonement of Christ played a critical role, Stanton seems to reject the idea of Christ as an
intermediary and to subscribe tacitly to a Quaker-influenced sense of the inner light. (At least she
is convinced of her own direct connection to God.) On the other hand, one doubts her full appreci-
ation of the Quaker experience after reading her account of a meeting of Friends she attended
with a female doctor: "I was moved to speak, the doctor was not, though I urged her to be."
Letter from Elizabeth C. Stanton to Susan B. Anthony (Aug. 20, 1883), collected In Stanton
Papers, supra note 3.
32. Stanton, supra note 29, at 63.
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the more difficult mastery over themselves; only in a society of self-
governing people can the principles of individual growth be fully
realized.
II. STANTON AND THE LIBERAL INDIVIDUAL
The love of freedom was more than a child's attribute; unfolding
first in childhood, it persisted as long as life itself. As evidenced by her
view of childhood, Stanton defined liberty as the state of nature. To one
critic who attributed a naturally passive role to women, Stanton re-
sponded bitterly that it had taken centuries of persecution, with "the
whole power of the civil and canon law. . . under all forms of religious
fanaticism, culminating in witch-craft"3 3 prosecutions, to control and
subdue women. Her sex had, nonetheless, "shown her love of individual
freedom, her desire for self-government, while her achievements in
practical affairs and her courage in the great emergencies of life have
vindicated her capacity to exercise this right."' 4
The premium Stanton placed on individual freedom was the theme
of Solitude of Self, the address that Stanton gave before the congres-
sional Judiciary Committee in 1892 and later before the annual suf-
frage meeting. 5 It is often acclaimed as her greatest speech, and its
beauty is piercing. At the same time, it is a bleak statement of social
relations, one almost without hope.36 In it Stanton denies the possibility
of human contact or communication in any but the most superficial
sense. Common pleasures are fleeting; "even our friendship and love we
never fully share with another; there is something of every passion in
every situation we conceal." 37 The critical moments of each life are
those-however brief-when isolation is total. In bereavement, impris-
onment, poverty, war, abandonment, and old age-"[a]like mid the
greatest triumphs and darkest tragedies of life we walk alone."38 Stan-
ton denied the idea of community that sparked so many women's
33. Id. at 62-63.
34. Id. at 63.
35. Address by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Hearing of the Woman Suffrage Association Before
the Committee on the Judiciary (Jan. 18, 1892) [hereinafter Solitude of Self, the speech's com-
mon name]. There is a lightly edited version of Solitude of Self reprinted in STANTON &
ANTHONY, supra note 4, at 246.
36. DuBois points out that it anticipates "the existentialist philosophy associated with the re-
birth of feminism in our own time, and modern feminism's concern with the 'personal' elements of
women's experience." STANTON & ANTHONY, supra note 4, at 246.
37. Solitude of Self, supra note 35, at 2.
38. Id.
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groups in their associational efforts; the woman who joined groups to
discuss questions of health and sanitation, foreign policy, education, or
other social functions, could only make her own solitude "respectable"
and provide work-if futile work-for her hands.39
Even the human Christ never rose above such mortal limits. Stan-
ton proclaimed his command "Bear ye one another's burdens" to be
beyond the individual's scope. The idea of the atonement, the shifting
of weight onto stronger shoulders, had never appealed to the individual-
ist in Stanton. "In fitting out an army we give each soldier his own
knapsack, arms, powder, his blanket, cup, knife, fork and spoon. We
provide alike for all their individual necessities, then each man bears
his own burden. ' 40 Her summary of Christ's life was selective, a litany
of failures; neglecting triumphal entries, righteous wrath, and even the
Resurrection, she concentrated instead on moments of abandonment
and betrayal. Christ's experience on earth was most fully realized, not
in the Crucifixion, but in the more bitter moments of despair alone in
the garden at Gethsemane. 4 1
For Stanton, the individual's life did not lack a purpose; but its
purpose was not to establish any particular set of relations among
human beings. The social gospel movement and socially oriented femi-
nists championed a kind of counter-Reformation in their rejection of
the emphasis on faith over works; in the context of an industrializing
America, the need for works was great and rendered the contemplative
life and the dead theological intricacies of salvation selfish and outmo-
ded. Far from criticizing the Reformation, Stanton invoked it con-
stantly, interpreting it as a movement in support of "individual rights,
individual conscience and judgment . . . the basic principles of our re-
publican government and Protestant religion .,"2 Critical as she was of
the male-dominated church hierarchy and the tyranny of superstition,
the great Protestant principle of freedom of conscience represented for
her the core of truth at the heart of a rotten institutional
body-approximately the same way she looked on the principle of lib-
erty in the Constitution.43 Stanton had no time for the creeds and codes
of the church fathers. But the state of the individual soul was still
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id. at 2.
41. Id. at 4.
42. Stanton, Suffrage a Natural Right 2 (1894). See also 2 HLsToRy OF WOMAN SUFRAGE,
supra note 6, at 437, for a NWSA resolution to that effect.
43. 2 Revolution 324 (Nov. 26, 1868) (Issue 21).
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paramount for her; as a thorough-going antinomian, she consistently
denied that any outside authority could dictate, judge, or influence the
state of her soul. As compared to social feminists Stanton was a great
spiritualist, emphasizing the progress of the soul over charitable deeds,
even while moving farther away from orthodox religion."
The most compelling metaphor for human life in Stanton's vocab-
ulary is that of the "solitary voyage": "No matter how much women
prefer to lean . . . they must make the voyage of life alone, [relying
on] their own skill and judgment in the hour of danger, and, if not
equal to the occasion, [man and woman] alike they perish."' The voy-
age metaphor allows for nothing of the social, nothing of the rooted or
familial. The "solitary voyager" is not with mess mates, but "'upon the
deck of the ship at midnight . . . [with a] feeling . . of utter desola-
tion and loneliness; a little speck of life shut in by a tremendous dark-
ness .... , "48 The voyage is not aimless. Carrying over from antebel-
lum feminist rhetoric her belief in a liberal Protestant mandate for the
full development of God-given capacities, Stanton is insistent that wo-
man's goal is the achievement of "the highest development of which
they are capable."' 47 For the end of human life is the growth of the
individual, and the individual has the duty to resist whatever restricts
growth.48
The duty to resist often pitted the individual against others .4 Par-
ticularly toward the end of her life, Stanton's arguments for woman
suffrage take on a foreboding air; women will need the ballot in emer-
gencies, as solitary marooned voyagers, as a woman trapped in a burn-
ing house needs self-reliance.50 It is tempting to attribute this sourness
and sense of danger and isolation to old age and exclusion from the
mainstream of the woman's movement after the NWSA's reunion with
44. Aileen Kraditor in Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement describes Solitude of Self as
an elegy for "a solitary human soul in the Protestant tradition responsible for its own destiny." A.
KRADITOR, supra note 1, at 48.
45. Solitude of Self, supra note 35, at 1-2.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Stanton, supra note 29, at 67. In Solitude of Self, Stanton suggests that the rights and
duties of women are "individual happiness and development." Solitude of Self, supra note 35, at
1.
48. 1 Revolution 361 (June I1, 1868) (Issue 23).
49. One particularly stirring speech on this subject was Stanton's on the famous McFarland-
Richardson murder trial. See STANTON & ANTHONY, supra note 4, at 125-30; see also E. PLECK,
DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLO-
NIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1987).
50. See Solitude of Self, supra note 35; Stanton, supra note 29; Stanton, supra note 42.
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the more conservative American Woman Suffrage Association in 1890.
But, in an article in the Lily of 1852, Stanton fully anticipated her
later message that woman is her own "self-supporter, self defender, and
self protector, compelled to stand or fall, live or die, alone." '51 Time
probably increased her isolation; but her original perception that wo-
man is "an imaginary Robinson Crusoe with her woman Friday on a
solitary island" didn't change-and Stanton was often happier to do
without Friday.52
Throughout her career Stanton, as well as other liberal feminists,
showed an overriding concern for corporeal integrity and a vivid appre-
hension of the possibilities of violence to the person. Nineteenth-cen-
tury feminists across the ideological spectrum shared a belief in volun-
tary motherhood and sexual choice for women, especially condemning
drunken male aggression against women and children. But the
evangelicals, despite their focus on intemperance, devoted significantly
less time to the issue of male violence against women and were far less
willing to condemn orthodox marriage itself as a breeder of violence.
Liberals, far more than the evangelicals, dwelt in detail on the potential
for male violence against women, recounting each new horror and in-
dignity almost with relish, as though justifying their world view. Their
constant litany of physical crimes against women both made public an
important source of "private" oppression and reenforced liberal femi-
nism's special fearfulness about physical violations and infringements.
Human beings' natural state was not only constant rebellion
against illegitimate authority, but also constant peril. In her defense of
political rights for the individual, Stanton often pictured the polity as a
dangerous place for the liberal individual. Suffrage in particular served
the adult as a weapon of self-defense against abusive authority when
"youthful pranks" no longer sufficed. In her 1894 speech, Suffrage a
Natural Right, she drove home the analogy between the ballot and the
bow and arrow with which early man "exercised his natural right of
self protection." 53 Stanton characterized the ballot as the "substitute in
civilisation" for the "rude weapons of savage life," proclaiming it tyr-
anny to take away the means by which the individual defended person
*and property.54 Not impressed by any social compact that had made so
few provisions for women, she declared that, in compacting for the es-
51. 4 Lily 40 (May 1852) (Issue 5).
52. Solitude of Self, supra note 35, at 1.
53. Stanton, supra note 42, at 2-3.
54. Id.
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tablishment of government and mutual protection, no one gave up a
"natural right to protect themselves and their property by laws of their
own making, they simply substituted the ballot for the bow and
arrow."
55
Only individual ownership and individual control gave protection
in Stanton's world. Protection when provided by one for another was
always a paternalist trap; no two individuals disparate in power could
form a protective relationship without fatal harm to the liberty of the
protected, in the same way that no class can legislate for or represent
another class. In classic liberal style, she saw the individual constituted
and protected through the ownership of property, including rights in
that category as things owned by the classic possessive liberal individ-
ual.5 Children again illustrated the "natural" human response:
"[w]hoever touches their playthings without their consent arouses their
angry resistance, showing the natural desire to own property. '57 Prop-
erty is one of the ways in which the vulnerable individual protects her-
self in a cold world; like physical assault, "to deny the rights of prop-
erty [is] like cutting off the hands," disabling the body completely., 8
III. FEMINISM, FOURIER, AND FREE LovE
Stanton's endorsement of free love philosophy was a position that
followed naturally from her earlier intellectual leanings. The legacy of
slavery helped form Stanton's strong antipathy to physical and legal
restraints. The metaphor of slavery never lost its power for her, leaving
her hypersensitive to the potential for abuse in any human relationship,
particularly where there was a disparity in the parties' power. Much of
Stanton's respect for, and attention to, the laws of nature resulted from.
her discovery that they confirmed her belief that humans thrived in
freedom and solitude. She often used the metaphor of planetary orbits
to describe optimal social arrangements in which individuals whirled
around each other at a safe, orderly distance-planets rarely leaving
their orbits to attack or enslave other planets.59 Stanton endorsed bloo-
mers, physical exercise, and fresh air, and the general removal of all
55. Id.; see also Stanton, supra note 29, at 64.
56. See supra note 3.
57. Stanton, supra note 42, at 7. It is interesting to note that in pre-Lockeian terminology
"childlike" is a derogatory epithet, while for Stanton descriptions of children's behavior are used
as evidence of a natural order.
58. Solitude of Self, supra note 35, at 2.
59. See Stanton, supra note 29, at 67.
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physical badges of female servitude, stressing the freedom of the body
from all burdens and entanglements imposed from without. The
Revolution in 1869 even endorsed a health reformer's position that no
one should regularly sleep with another person, adding that there "is a
great physical law that all would do well to obey. Every man, woman
and child should have a bed to him or herself."6'
For Stanton, as for Stephen Pearl Andrews, the physical subjuga-
tion of women was a prime indicator of America's diseased state; the
indissoluble marriage relation was a carnal horror from "those dark
periods when marriage was held by the greatest doctors and priests of
the church to be a work of the flesh only.""' Voluntary motherhood and
the right to full and free divorce provided release from an unwanted
and often brutal physical bondage. The enlightened nineteenth-century
attitude toward the body sought to release it, particularly women's bod-
ies, from the corrosive hold of superiors in "feudal" relations of slavery
and orthodox Christian marriage.62
It was in this context that Stanton endorsed the doctrine of free
love-a concept that meant many things to many people. Ellen DuBois
suggests that her 1870 speech on marriage and divorce clearly estab-
lished Stanton as a partisan of free love.6 3 Certainly the works of radi-
cals like Robert Dale Owen and Frances Wright, and later Victoria
Woodhull and Annie Besant, influenced her profoundly.6 She agreed
with many of their positions and, above all, learned from them even
when she didn't agree. Along with George Sand and Mme de Stal,
they were in the small group of nineteenth-century figures who could
out-radical her, and she admired their intelligence and daring.
60. 3 Revolution 379 (June 17, 1869) (Issue 24). Stanton's thought here coincides with the
growth of new religions-Christian Science, spiritualism, faith healing-also centered around
physical health and culture. See Clark, Women and Religion In America. 1870-1920, in 2
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA 1870-1920, at 375-79 (J.F. Wilson ed. 1987).
61. 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 6. at 716-17 (1881).
62. See W. LEACH. TRUE LOVE AND PERFECT UNION: THE FEMINIST REFORMl OF SEX AND
SOCIETY passim (1980).
63. On Labor and Free Love: Two Unpublished Speeches of Elizabeth Cad) Stanton, in I
SIGNS 257, 263 (E. DuBois ed. 1975) [hereinafter On Labor and Free Love]. DuBois points out
Stanton's commitment to monogamy as well.
64. For references, see LETrTERS, supra note 24, at 61 (On reading Thomas Paine and Frances
Wright, she comments, "I am quite surprised to find them such rational and beautiful writers.").
See E. STANTON, supra note 13, at 353 (on Annie Besant); 3 Revolution 212 (Apr. 8. 1869) (Issue
14) (agrees with Robert Dale Owen on the marriage question in his debate with Horace Greeley);
Letter from Elizabeth C. Stanton to Lucretia Mott (April 1, 1872). collected In Stanton Papers,
supra note 3 (supporting Victoria Woodhull); see also W. LEACH, supra note 62; B. TAYLOR. EVE
AND THE NEW JERUSALEM: SOCIALISM AND FEMINISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1983).
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At the same time, her philosophical agreement with the free love
position had more to do with setting limits than with exploring sensual
experience. In an 1880 letter to her cousin and confidante, Elizabeth
Smith Miller, she expressed her private view that she could not support
free love where it was equated with promiscuity, but did support it
where it meant woman's right to give or withhold her body, bear chil-
dren or not, and be her own absolute sovereign. 5 In the same letter,
she declared her continuing belief in monogamy: for "everything short
of this make[s] a mongrel, sensual, discordant progeny . . . [s]oul
union should precede and exalt physical union. 6
Stanton was certainly no prude, and there is evidence that she
found women's sexual appetites to be as healthy and appropriate as
men's.617 Nevertheless, she might more accurately be described as a
partisan of self-ownership than of free love in its full erotic sense. Her
chief expressed interest in championing free love was to limit the pow-
ers of the state to intervene in sexual relations, as in other aspects of
individuals' lives. 8 Her belief that "we are one and all free lovers at
heart" posited a conviction-one she believed many others shared-
that, in "a good time coming," men and women would be "a law unto
themselves," and the police court, the state legislature, and bureaucrats
like "Recorder Hackett" would no longer interfere in relations of the
heart; whatever resulted from the liberty to choose would be free love.00
Stanton drove home the point that "freedom is one and indivisible," 0
whether intellectual, sexual, religious, or political. Of course, freedom
could always be misused, but Stanton felt that the misuse of sexual
freedom, like a misuse of economic freedom such as a bad investment,
was simply "the unavoidable friction of the machinery. '71
Despite her reluctance to see free love as sexual license, Stanton
was influenced by Victoria Woodhull and was in thorough agreement
with her that the question of women's political equality was moot with-
65. Letter from Elizabeth Stanton to Elizabeth S. Miller (Aug. 11, 1880), collected in Stan-
ton Papers, supra note 3.
66. Id.
67. E. GRIFFITH, supra note 14, at 96-97; STANTON & ANTHONY, supra note 4, at 94-98.
68. Other partisans of free love were much more explicit in celebrating erotic pleasure; in A
Speech on the Garden of Eden: Or, Paradise Lost and Found (1875), Victoria Woodhull imagines
an Eden that would have profoundly shaken Biblical scholars. V.C. WOODHULL & T.C. CLAFLIN,
THE HUMAN BODY THE TEMPLE OF GOD (1890); see also S. DITZION. MARRIAGE, MORALS, AND
SEX IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IDEAS (1953); W. LEACH, supra note 62.
69. On Labor and Free Love, supra note 63, at 266.
70. Id. at 267.
71. Id.
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out similar gains in sexual equality. For both Stanton and Woodhull
social and sexual rights, though they might define them differently,
were the key to political rights, and civil rights alone could not chal-
lenge women's subordination.
Woodhull herself was strongly influenced-some say ghost-writ-
ten-by Stephen Pearl Andrews, who was himself for many years im-
mersed in Fourierism and the communitarian movement. To describe a
chain linking Stanton at one end to Fourier at the other would be mis-
leading. At the same time, communitarianism was an important source
of radical thinking during Stanton's formative years and was certainly
a part of the universe of ideas out of which she constructed her own
theories. What American communitarians culled from Fourier and
what feminists picked and chose from communitarian thought, is re-
vealing both about the cultural conditions for the American reception
of Fourier and about where liberal feminists' hearts lay on the spec-
trum of social reform.
Charles Fourier's social philosophy rested on a vision of gratified
desire. At a time when most of the civilized world was retreating only
slowly from a belief in human nature's native state of sin, Fourier's
sympathy for the depth and mutability of human passions-for work,
love, and everything in between-produced one of the most bizarre and
humane utopian blueprints ever committed to paper. Fourier's critique
of existing institutions was damningly thorough, as reflected in his list
of the 144 permanent vices, including slavery, the wage labor system,
and hurricanes; his solutions were equally detailed, and equally grandi-
ose. 7 2 Not a Lockeian liberal, Fourier believed that individuals were
neither malleable nor rational-no tabula rasa-but were moved by
fundamental instinctual drives or passions.7 3 No forerunner of Freud,
either, he sought to liberate rather than to repress the passions, to pro-
vide an environment in which each could be gratified in its turn.
Fourier attacked existing institutions on two main fronts: work and
love. Harshly critical of the tedium of the new "wage slavery," his idea
of "Attractive Labor" was at bottom a repudiation of the work-curse
placed on Adam. Fourier reasoned that, if humankind was given an
appetite for the fruits of labor, it must have been given an appetite for
production, as well, and he employed a variety of techniques in his pro-
72. J. BEECHER. CHARLES FOURIER: THE VISIONARY AND His WORLD 197 (1986). This is the
most comprehensive work on Fourier that will ever bc written and is wonderfully readable. See
also THE UTOPIAN VISION OF CHARLES FOURIER (J. Beecher & R. Bienvenu eds. 1971).
73. J. BEECHER, supra note 72, at 220.
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posed utopian community, the phalanx, to make labor varied and plea-
surable for everyone. 4
The other main prong of Fourier's attack, the one that most con-
cerns us here, was the assault on the isolated nuclear family. Fourier
took the enlightened stance that "the extension of the privileges of
women is the fundamental cause of all social progress." 75 Since he saw
sexual passion as a quantity to be let loose rather than restrained,
Christian marriage seemed a form of "conjugal slavery," one of the
repressive authoritarian forms that warped human experience. Mar-
riage laws imposed a false constraint and permanency that ran counter
to the human inclination to spontaneity and diversity; like commerce
they produced deceitful and inefficient practices.7" Fourier saw women
as the primary victims of the existing social system-"a piece of mer-
chandise to be put up for sale to the highest bidder. 77 He suggested
that only the combination of economic and sexual independence-what
he called the economic and sexual minimums-which were guaranteed
in the Phalanx, would restore women's dignity and status and the in-
tegrity of sexual relations in general. 7 The isolated household proved
an indignity in labor terms as well; according to the communitarian
critique, the work of a single household sentenced woman to domestic
drudgery, an inefficient, piecemeal approach that could be improved
through communalizing domestic labor.
In tune with popular economic principles of his day, Fourier be-
lieved that energies became distorted and destructive when regulated
and repressed; but, when allowed to run their course, they worked in
beneficial harmony for both the individual and society. In fact, "the
man who devotes himself most ardently to pleasure becomes eminently
useful for the happiness of all." 1 Although Fourier shared with Adam
Smith and others a common belief in the invisible hand and the ineffi-
cacy of human regulation, his system went far beyond economic liber-
alism, toward the creation of a new religious philosophy. In reaction
against religious orthodoxy, Fourier wholly rejected the notion of origi-
74. R. BRISBANE, ALBERT BRISBANE: A MENTAL BIOGRAPHY 180 (1893).
75. J. BEECHER, supra note 72, at 118.
76. See id. ch. 11, at 220-40 & ch. 15, at 297-317.
77. Id. at 206.
78. Id. at 206-08. Fourier's fascination with the corruption of sexual norms under capitalism
led him to muse, for example, on the 49 varieties in the "Hierarchy of Cuckoldom," which in-
cluded the "Warlike or Swaggering Cuckold," "the Supportive or Straw Man Cuckold," and "the
Trumpeter Cuckold." THE UTOPIAN VISION OF CHARLES FOURIER, supra note 72, at 183-88.
79. THE UTOPIAN VISION OF CHARLES FOURIER, supra note 72, at 43.
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nal sin, celebrating a capacity for human happiness and a liberation
from long-faced Calvinism, which owed much to Enlightenment
thought.80 But there was a God in Fourier's universe, one who had cre-
ated humans with a capacity for joy and who had their best interests at
heart. It was this God's divine plan Fourier saw behind the working
social harmonies he envisioned. In this way, religion and economic lib-
eralism were fused into an optimistic belief in the God-given power of
individuals to produce, create, desire, and enjoy-a much more potent
mix in a world still tied to religious forms than a theory of economic
deregulation standing on its own.81
In Fourier's utopia, the communalization of work and love were
inextricable, critical elements of human liberation; in fact, Fourier at
times hinted that the question of free love was actually "the most im-
portant branch of the theory of attraction. 82 Many American students
of Fourier, most notably Albert Brisbane, his translator, largely ig-
nored the call for sexual liberation, concentrating instead on the doc-
trine of Attractive Labor and the promise of a revolution in the wage
labor system.8 3 Brisbane's patron was Stanton's opponent Horace Gree-
ley, who opened the front page of his newspaper to Brisbane for a daily
column on utopian associationism, and who actively rejected Fourier's
vision of deregulated marriage. The Greeley-Brisbane associationists
were bound to traditional forms of moral authority within the family.
Brisbane suggested that, while the nuclear household was badly organ-
ized, marriage itself was an eternal type, for it and the family "exist in
the moral nature of man."84 Marriage, like commerce and religion,
would be preserved in its true form once institutional distortions were
removed, although individualized labor, and not monogamy itself, was
the distortion in question for both Brisbane and Greeley.
Brisbane, no fan of organized religion, still hungered for a spiritual
system to replace the one lost and felt that the invisible hand was sure
to have a god attached to it somewhere. His quest for a comprehensive
80. Id.
81. See J. BEECHER, supra note 72, at 224-25.
82. Id. at 120.
83. Id. at 297 & introduction. Brisbane's writings from the 1840s, the high water mark of
Fourierism in the United States, dismiss the "Social or affective Passions" as too '"vast and ab-
struse" a terrain to cover. Translation from Fourier's Work, Entitled: Thorte des Quatre Move-
ments, 2 PHALANX 11, 25-26 (Nov. 4, 1843) (two parts) [hereinafter Translation from Fourer's
Work]. He also admits that, in speaking publicly, he never broached Fourier's critique of tradi-
tional marriage. IR BRISBANE, supra note 74, at 210.
84. A. BRISBANE. A CONCISE EXPOSITION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ASSOCIATION (8th ed. New
York 1844)*.
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social system was millennial in its belief that "'[tihe kingdom of
Heaven' was to come to us in this terrestrial world by the establish-
ment of a true Social Order."85 A perpetual tension between the indi-
vidual and the group plagued American associationists. But, in Bris-
bane's vision, it was held in check by the idea that selfless Christian
love was the basis of the spiritual attraction that led to association, love
that "leads them [associationists] to identify other's interests with their
own-to bear one another's burdens-to feel the wrongs of others as
their wrongs, and the sufferings of others as their sufferings-and to
seek the good of others as they seek their own good."'86
By contrast Stephen Pearl Andrews, although he was also engaged
in a search for the underlying harmonious principle, refused to look to
Christianity as a model. His major treatise, The Science of Society,
proclaimed itself as dealing "in no vague aspirations after 'the good
time coming'... [it] will propound definite principles which demand
to be regarded as having all the validity of scientific truths. 87 An-
drews's theology also renounced the Calvinist assumption of sinful
human nature, but celebrated free love over monogamy, private prop-
erty over communal property, and individualism over groupness, in
sharp contrast to Brisbane. One commentator calls Andrews's theories
"The Theology of Man."88
Andrews was torn throughout his life between his attraction to
Fourier's system and to the more individualistic associational principles
of Josiah Warren, sometimes called the chief architect of libertarian-
ism.89 Warren's creed was marked by an intense dedication to the
rights of the individual. Though an associationist-he and Andrews co-
founded a utopian community, Modern Times, on Long Is-
land-Warren believed fervently in private property and in the right of
85. Exposition of Views and Principles, Industry, Religion, 1 PHALANX 4, 8-9 (Oct. 5, 1843)
(Issue 1). Some reader of the Concise Exposition agreed with Brisbane and left a marginal note
in a nineteenth-century hand reading "all this can be realized only in the coming Kingdom of God
same is not of this age over which Satan has a Principality." (A. BRISBANE, supra note 84, at 19
(of the copy in Firestone Library's Rare Book Room, Princeton University.))
86. Translationfrom Fourier's Work, supra note 83, at 14.
87. S.P. ANDREWS, THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY 6 (1851 & reprint 1970) (2 parts).
88. C. Shively, The Thought of Stephen Pearl Andrews (1812-1886), (1960) (unpublished
manuscript) (University of Wisconsin, M.A. thesis).
89. Writers on Andrews conflict over whether he made a straight-line progression from
Fourier's thought to Warren's, or wavered back and forth. See id.; see also J. MARTIN, MEN
AGAINST THE STATE: THE EXPOSITORS OF INDIVIDUALIsT ANARCHISM IN AMERICA (3d ed. 1970)
(lst ed. 1953).
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the individual to be free of any compulsion whatever. 0 Although War-
ren saw the principle of association as a way of addressing inequalities,
the right to dissociate was as important to him as the right to associ-
ate.9 1 Warren's community was built on the complete separation and
autonomy of each individual-"each being 'the law unto himself.' "82
Andrews enthusiastically adopted the doctrine of individual sover-
eignty, interpreting the thrust of Fourier's doctrine of the affections as
a guarantee that each could choose his own destiny and, therefore,
"'be a law unto himself.' -9 For Andrews, the freedom of the individ-
ual was the logical result of the three great movements in history: the
Protestant Reformation, which made the individual conscience para-
mount; the American Revolution, which established the individual's po-
litical sovereignty; and his own movement, "socialism," which would
ensure personal sovereignty as well.9 In its most extreme formulation,
Andrews declared, "'[t]he essential condition of freedom is disconnec-
tion-individualization--disintegration of interests.' "' l Ultimately,
only the individual can be the judge of his or her own actions, in the
political as in the personal sphere:
"I claim individually to be my own nation, I take this opportu-
nity to declare my National Independence, and to notify all
other potentates, that they may respect my Sovereignty. I may
have to fight to establish my claim, but . . . sooner or later I
will come to the recognition of it."'9
But here, too, Andrews's vision followed Fourier's. Although the
individual was the highest unit of social and political life, Andrews did
not see public life as millions of "monads" in conflict, but as monads
working together in the harmony produced when each obeyed the law
90. W. REICHERT, PARTISANS OF FREEDOM: A STUDY OF AIERICAN ANARCHItSM 64-99
(1976).
91. J. MARTIN, supra note 89, at 38.
92. Shively, supra note 88, at 3 (Andrews' thought cited by J. WARREN. EQUITABLE COXt-
MERCE 18 (1849)). Stanton had a strong affinity for this phrase, as well.
93. S.P. ANDREWS, supra note 87, at 9-11.
94. See Shively, supra note 88, at 13-14; S.P. ANDREWS, supra note 87. at 9-10. Note the
similarity to Stanton's thought here, although her trinity would probably have been composed of
the Reformation, the Revolution, and the woman's movement.
95. C. Shively, supra note 88, at 47 (quoting S.P. ANDREWS. supra note 87, at 47).
96. Id. at 44 (quoting LovE. MARRIAGE. AND DIVORCE. AND TIlE SOVEREIGNTY OF TIlE INDI-
VIDUAL 62 (S.P. Andrews ed. 1853)). Andrews was not completely without concern for conse-
quences; he claimed that each individual was sovereign as long as he could assume the conse-
quences of his actions-which Andrews labels "costs"--by himself and not turn them into moral
or economic externalities, the burden to be born by others. S.P. ANDREWS, supra note 87, at 36.
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of its own attractions. "Objects bound together contrary to their nature
must and will seek to rectify themselves by breaking the bonds that
confine them, while those which come together by their own affinities
remain quiescent and content."" Andrews, then, did not jettison the
good of the group entirely; he supported "cooperation" rather than
"combination" or "amalgamation," defining cooperation as when-
"'each, in pursuing his own pleasure or benefit, contributes incidentally
to the pleasure or benefit of others.' "8
Andrews admits the paradox of "socialism"-that the individual
in exercising his own sovereignty may throw the burden of his actions
on others-and that the attempt to function as a community may in-
fringe on the individual as well. Sometimes self-sacrifice and the com-
promise of individual rights is necessary; for this reason, communities
may need governments as an interim measure.99 But still protesting
that "dependence and close connections" are the roots of despotism, as
disconnection is the root of freedom, he condemned communities like
the Shakers and the Rappites as based on "religious submission . . . to
despotic rule."' 10 Andrews was ultimately willing to abandon society in
favor of the individual, on the theory that socialism itself can become a
form of tyranny; its form, he admitted, might be antagonistic to the
ends of human freedom. 1 1 This commitment to individualism raised a
thorny internal contradiction within Andrew's communitarian scheme
and proved a bone of contention between him and more traditional as-
sociationists like Brisbane and Greeley. 20 2
Despite disagreement over the liberating power of individualism
and sexuality in restructuring human relations, Fourier, Warren, Bris-
bane, and Andrews shared an enthusiastic support for woman's rights
and a critique of the isolated household as a work unit. An article in
the Phalanx in 1843 included "Domestic Service" in the list of "Servi-
tudes To Be Abolished," labeling it a branch of the system of hired
labor, which created its own class, one composed largely of house-
97. S.P. ANDREWS, supra note 87, at 15; see also W. REICHERT, supra note 90.
98. C. Shively, supra note 88, at 49 (quoting S.P. ANDREWS, supra note 87, at 48).
99. S.P. ANDREWS, supra note 87, at 37-39.
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. Andrews does distinguish between the "natural" connection between the mother and
child, which is not destructive, and the artificial connections of adults, which are. Id. at 37.
102. American socialism in the second half of the nineteenth century was in general more
anarchistic, more oriented toward the individual than its European counterpart, which tended
more toward a state socialism. Charles Fourier himself attacked the liberal conception of "per-
sonal freedom" as it evolved in America as empty and formalistic without the surrounding com-
munitarian structure. J. MARTIN, supra note 89, at 3-4.
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wives.' 03 Thus, these male utopian socialists recognized early that the
gendered division of labor characteristic of industrial society created a
sex-class-what Brisbane called a "low sphere of action."' ° Brisbane
in his later writing was increasingly explicit about the need to turn
households into cooperative arrangements, collectivizing both domestic
labor and child care. These arrangements would leave the monogamous
family intact and would allow women a large measure of autonomy
over their own households, particularly in child-rearing, where mothers
could exercise as much or as little direct supervision as they chose,
leaving the rest to nurses called "collective mothers"1l°B He believed
that only when isolated drudgery was abolished-and similar sugges-
tions were made by the other associationists-would women be able to
elevate themselves from a condition of "domestic servitude."'1 In the
minds of communitarians, conditions of material inequality far out-
stripped conditions of civil equality in importance; Andrews states cate-
gorically that, while "woman herself is confiscated," her right to own
property or vote would be of minimal value.107
Despite associationists' support for woman's rights and their
shared core of reform and feminist sympathies with suffragists, many
in the woman's movement viewed the associationists with suspicion and
hostility. Associationist ideas only percolated through feminist theory
in a partial and roundabout way. Perhaps understandably, when so few
in organized suffragism worked at industrial jobs, the issue of "attrac-
tive labor" did not draw a crowd; to the extent that women reformers
were concerned in this period with labor issues the concern was with
working women and expressed itself more in immediate concern over
wages, hours, and working conditions. The suffrage literature gave little
or no space to labor reforms proposed by Brisbane, Warren, or
Andrews.
In addition, the utopian community offered women a mixed bag of
restraints and opportunities.'08 Housework collectivities and the
103. Dangers Which Threaten the Future, 2 PHALANX 17 (Nov. 4. 1843) (Issue 2).
104. A. BRISBANE, THE THEORY OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE HU.NAN PASSIONS 141 If. (New
York 1856).
105. Id. at 142.
106. Id. at 143.
107. Andrews, Love, Marriage, and the Condition of Woman, in LovE. MARRIAGE. AND Di-
VORCE, AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE INDIVIDUAL 11, 34 ff. (C. Shively ed. 1975) [hereinafter
LOVE, MARRIAGE. AND DIVORCE].
108. P. Johnson & S. Wilentz, The Kingdom of Matthias: Sex and Salvation In Jacksonian
New York, Paper delivered at the Charles Warren Center, Harvard University, (Nov. 1983):
Clark, supra note 60, at 374-76.
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destruction of gendered work categories found in communities like
Oneida appealed to many women seeking to escape from the rigid sepa-
ration of domestic and public work. The first generation of liberal femi-
nists did not glorify domestic work as more home-centered women did,
and often complained of the toll such drudgery took on women's health.
Stanton, again in the forefront, lashed out at the "immense amount of
sentimental nonsense talked about the isolated home . . . for a poor
farmer with wife and child in the solitude of a praire home, a co-opera-
tive household with society would be inestimable blessing. Woman's
work can never be properly organized in the isolated home."' 09 Stanton
on several occasions voiced admiration for Fourier's arrangement of
communalized domestic chores."10
Despite the attractions of communalism, rule over the home was
still an important type of power, one exaggerated and idealized by the
culture, and was difficult for many women to resist. The destruction of
the nuclear household was never an articulated goal of the woman's
movement (although Stanton occasionally hinted darkly that it would
be changed beyond recognition), and relatively few women in the im-
mediate post-Civil War period even broached the subject of household
collectives."' Feminists well understood the problem of the isolated
household, but did not accept the communitarian solutions that perhaps
gave up too much. 12
In addition, communitarians were tarred with the "free love"
brush. Liberalization of divorce laws remained controversial in the suf-
frage movement until the next century, in part because of the (realis-
tic) fear that association with radical social positions could taint the
suffrage cause. Free love posed this problem in spades, and genuinely
shocked many ladies' sensibilities to boot. Although careful to distance
109. LETrERS, supra note 24, at 346.
110. See, e.g., E. STANTON, supra note 13, at 147. Reversing the worst fears of 1960s parents,
Victoria Woodhull suggests that sexual freedom will ultimately lead to cooperative households.
Woodhull, Tried as By Fire; Or, the True and the False, Socially. . .(1874), in THE VICTORIA
WOODHULL READER, supra note 30, at 44.
111. On the general subject of domestic collectivization, see D. HAYDEN. THE GRAND DOMES-
TIC REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF FEMINIST DESIGNS FOR AMERICAN HOMES, NEIGHBORHOODS,
AND CITIES (1981).
112. The second generation in the Oneida community saw a revolt by women pressing for a
return of many functions of domestic work and child rearing to the nuclear family as a way of
strengthening their power base. See Kern, Ideology and Reality: Sexuality and Women's Status
in the Oneida Community, 20 RADICAL HIsT. REV. 180 (1979). Other than her distaste for house-
work, it's not clear that Stanton ever felt any strongly communitarian urges; evidence in fact
points in the other direction.
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themselves from the free lovers, the NWSA platform reflected a will-
ingness to link issues of personal and political freedom together and a
commitment to women's autonomy in their personal lives that took
much-in part through Stanton's mediation-from the utopian socialist
commitment to bodily autonomy.111 Self-ownership was a hard nut for
the rank and file of the NWSA to crack at first, harder for many than
suffrage. By the mid-1870s, though, the issues of prostitution, the
double standard, marital abuse, and voluntary motherhood were openly
discussed and added to the organization's agenda.1"" In no small part
due to the influence of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, woman's "natural
right" to her body had become a pillar of mainstream liberal feminist
thought.
IV. THE NATURAL ROOTS OF NATURAL RIGHTS
In a tract published in 1894, Stanton most clearly spelled out her
philosophy of natural rights.
113. The disagreement on that score came from the Boston-based AWSA whom Woodhull
and Claflin's Weekly accused of deliberately ignoring women's social wrongs to pursue the limited
ends of the ballot and financial equality. As the Weekly said, " ' [Tlaxation without representation'
has a very hollow, sepulchral sound." Woodhull's position as an outlier-and reputation as a loose
cannon-allowed her to express herself more freely on the subject of the "Boston ladies" than
Stanton was able to do in politic fashion, but it is easy to imagine Stanton savoring Woodhull's
charge that the Stone-Blackwell group heaped scorn on free lovers and others "who choose to walk
in their own way rather than to be led by even the immaculate Athenians." The Bostonians,
Woodhull suspected, found "all the acts necessary to reproduction. . . constitutionally and inher-
ently disgusting." Woodhull (this article is unattributed, but I believe she wrote it) goes on to
suggest helpfully that perhaps the Boston ladies do not trust themselves and need to have a code
of laws restraining "any lustful sheep's-eye glances . . . toward their friends of the masculine
gender." 3 Woodhull & Claflin's Weekly 10 (Nov. 4, 1871) (Issue 25).
Voodhull's broadside was perhaps a response to a resolution from an earlier meeting of the
American Equal Rights Association-or at least to the attitude behind it-repudiating the free
love movement, introduced by Henry Blackwell and supported by Mary Livermore and Lucy
Stone, all key members of the Boston AWSA. See 2 HtsToRY OF WONIAN SUFFRAGE, supra note
6, at 389. Victoria Woodhull's fitful relations with the NWSA are recounted in E. GRIFITH.
supra note 14; J. JOHNSTON, Mns. SATAN (1967); STANTON & ANTHONY, supra note 4. Woodhull
was briefly a hero of the movement following her successful 1871 speech to Congress. and many
people adopted the strategy she outlined there. When Woodhull's part in publicizing Henry Ward
Beecher's affair with a parishioner and the resulting scandal became known, however, even her
partisans felt some pressing need to get in line with the rest of the immaculate Athenians, and she
was dropped from the NWSA roster. Woodhull's presence on the platform never signalled any
acceptance of her free love views by the rank and file; her "new departure" strategy was largely
free of such rhetoric, although the strategy itself-that women already had the vote as a matter of
prior right and constitutional entitlement through the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments-was
grounded in the same theory of natural rights as her philosophy of sexual freedom. See STAN-TON
& ANTHONY, supra note 4, at 101-07.
114. W. LEACH, supra note 62, at 85 if; STANTON & ANTHONY, supra note 4, at 97.
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We argue the rights of persons from their necessities. To
breathe, sleep, walk, eat, and drink, are natural rights, neces-
sary to physical development. So the right to think, express
one's opinion, mould public sentiment, to choose one's condi-
tions and environments, are necessities for psychical develop-
ment . . . in the study of human beings, we see their wants
and needs, their capacities and powers and from their mani-
festations, we argue their natural rights.11
Commentators have long pinpointed natural rights as a cornerstone of
liberal feminist philosophy, using the phrase as shorthand for the set of
claims and principles adopted by the Founding Fathers, equality fore-
most among them."1 ' In fact-as the quotation from Suffrage a Natu-
ral Right shows quite clearly-liberal feminists' expression of natural
rights philosophy departs sharply from the male eighteenth-century,
revolutionary tradition, although it employs the same vocabulary. Un-
like the Founding Fathers, Stanton saw freedom of physical movement,
autonomy, as the root natural right. Revolutionary philosophy did not
denigrate self-ownership; on the contrary, it was in many ways a given
since rights were being sought for white men of clearly independent
position, whose status as self-owning was not challenged and not at is-
sue. Given the lack of any significant group of unfree white laborers,
even the issue of universal male suffrage in the early nineteenth century
did not raise the question of self-ownership in the same way it was
raised by later efforts to enfranchise women and black Americans.
The philosophy of universal male suffrage laid down few require-
ments for citizenship. Nonetheless, a vestigial notion of "citizen" still
centered around attributes commonly associated with citizenship that
in practice most women and blacks could not share-autonomy, owner-
ship of property, education, participation in the public sphere. In fact,
across the spectrum of potential voters from the ex-field slave to the
lady Athenians of Boston, common humanity lay in tenanting a human
body, and it was around this common chord that much of Stanton's
natural rights argument was built.
Women stressed rights as rooted in physical autonomy from the
earliest days of the movement, as shown by a comparison of the griev-
ances enumerated in the Declaration of Independence and those in the
Declaration of Sentiments penned at the first woman's rights meeting
115. Stanton, supra note 42, at 6-7.
116. See E. DuBoIs, supra note 1; A. KRADITOR, supra note 1.
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at Seneca Falls and modeled on the earlier document. 117 Eighteenth-
century American revolutionaries protested "slavery," but it was not
the slavery of physical abuse, marital rape, or forced labor. 18 Many of
the original Declaration's eighteen counts against George III com-
plained of the colonists' inability to participate in government and pub-
lic life, or the imposition of harsh measures without participation or
representation. Their natural rights tradition posited an overarching set
of principles guaranteeing rights that could largely be described as civil
rights, insuring consent to government on issues such as representation
and taxation, and protection from arbitrary legal and political power.
The rights of individuals were indeed paramount; but the personality
constructed was largely a civil personality, the needs largely civil needs.
Rights for Stanton did not originate in some conception of the
civic individual, but in the inviolate body. The Declaration of Senti-
ments, in which Stanton played the part of Thomas Jefferson, laid out
eighteen grievances of its own; many were directed at the procurement
of women's civil rights, such as the right to vote and own property. But
others explicitly attacked men's "absolute tyranny," which made wo-
man the slave of her husband and allowed him to imprison and chastise
her; which formulated the double standard of sexual conduct so deni-
grating to women; and which framed the laws of divorce so as to deny
effectively women's escape from a bad or violent marriage. Yet another
area of discontent, unthinkable in the eighteenth-century original, was
that man "has usurped the power of Jehovah himself" in assigning wo-
man a sphere of action, deliberately stunting her education and full
development.
Not content simply to rectify woman's place in the public sphere,
the founding mothers aimed to reconstruct woman's view of herself and
her most intimate relations as a necessary preliminary to revamping
her public personality. From Seneca Falls onward, feminist natural
rights theory looked to human behavior and needs and the physical pat-
terns of life, to determine what "natural" or God-ordained laws
were. 19 It became commonplace in the movement to refer to human
117. 1 HIsToRY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 6, at 70-71 (1881).
118. For the claims of American revolutionaries, see B. BAtLYN. IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
119. The fact that women modeled the Declaration of Sentiments so closely on the Declara-
tion of Independence-its language is virtually identical except for the specifics of the charges
themselves-is often cited as evidence that women followed closely in the founding traditions.
Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, etc., but to indict men in exactly the same terms in
which they indicted the tyrant George III seems a back-handed compliment, as well as an ac-
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rights as based on "natural necessity."12 Early on Stanton refuted al-
together the positivist school of rights thinking when she complained
that "Mr. Higginson belongs to the Jeremy Bentham school, that law
makes right. I am a disciple of the new philosophy that man's wants
make his rights."u 2 1 Natural rights philosophy as she constructed it did
indeed spring from, and was closely identified with, physical needs. Al-
though as such it resulted in meaningful claims for civil rights, Stanton
defined even civil rights as serving ultimately to protect the individual's
safety, as well.
In Stanton's view, all rights sprang from self-ownership. She was
convinced that, for both the woman and the slave, civil rights such as
the rights to vote and to own property would be worthless until "the
great idea of his right to himself, of his personal dignity . . . take[s]
possession of his soul."' 22 As Woodhull claimed, "[A] statement of wo-
man's rights which ignores the right of self-ownership as the first of all
rights is insufficient to meet the demand. 1 23 The rights of the individ-
ual and the citizen had the same origin, and their public and private
interests demanded the same protection-"Individual freedom and self-
government, citizenship and suffrage, are synonymous."24 Stanton
fused the personal and the political in a way that expanded the concept
and scope of citizenship considerably, at the same time stressing per-
sonal growth and freedom as the basis and end of those rights. The
Founders would have agreed with her that the rights of governments
flow from the rights of individuals, but would not have gone on to add
that the individual has the duty to resist whatever restricts his personal
growth in preference to all "constitutions, customs, creeds, and
knowledgment of the power of the argument.
120. Lockwood, The Right of Women to Vote, Guaranteed by the Constitution (1871), re-
printed in 2 Woodhull & Claflin's Weekly 1 (Feb. 25, 1871) (Issue 15). For similar language, see
also address by Stanton in Proceedings of the First Anniversary of the American Equal Rights
Association 8 (New York 1867) [hereinafter Proceedings] (suffrage as necessary to protection of
person and property "as are air and motion to life"; women and blacks are not "outside all human
laws and necessities").
121. Letter from Elizabeth C. Stanton to Susan B. Anthony (July 4, 1858), collected in Stan-
ton Papers, supra note 3.
122. Letter from Elizabeth C. Stanton to Susan B. Anthony (July 20, 1857), collected In
Stanton Papers, supra note 3; Letter from Elizabeth C. Stanton to Lucy Stone (Nov. 24, 1856),
collected in Stanton Papers, supra note 3.
123. Resolutions from suffrage meeting of 1871, cited in Woodhull, A Speech on the Princi-
ples of Social Freedom... November 20, 1871, in THE VICTOlA WOODHUJLL READER 5 (M.B.
Stern ed. 1974). It was also resolved that "the woman's movement means no less the complete
social as well as the political enfranchisement of mankind." Id.
124. Stanton, supra note 42, at 8.
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codes."125
At the same time, predicating rights on the most elemental needs
also posits a kind of equitable allotment, or at least heads off substan-
tial inequity. In her address to the constitutional convention of New
York in 1867, Stanton claims for each individual the "right to every-
thing on earth and air, on land and sea . . to all that is needful for
body and soul, and there is no limit to the exercise of your rights but in
the infringement of the rights of another." 2 ' Here, and throughout her
work, Stanton shows the influence of liberal thought in her belief that
the widest scope of freedom to consume, act, and enjoy was possible for
all individuals and that no conflicts between the needs of individuals
would arise.127 "Infringement" in Stanton's terms was the classic legal
punch in the nose and could not come about through the simple fact of
needing; shaped by the early liberal optimism that unfettered human
energy could produce limitless goods, the problem of redistribution, or
the conflict of rights between individuals, rarely arose in Stanton's
thinking.
This definition of natural rights as rooted in the safety and well-
being of the body makes sense of the idea of civil rights as defensive
weapons. The ballot signified "bread, education, self-protection, self-
reliance and self-respect; to the wife it means the control of her own
person, property, and earnings. 1 28 Such a definition also theoretically
did away with the idea of qualified suffrage, life itself and the instinct
of self-preservation being the only qualifications. Isabella Beecher
Hooker, in a speech to Congress, eloquently claimed her right to vote:
"I may have been born with less capacity than the least among you,
with small chance of growing to your mental stature, or reaching your
standard of moral elevation; but I have a perfect right to sit in your
midst, pigmy that I may be . . ,,129 Women demanded that "the
125. Stanton, I Revolution 361 (June I1, 1868) (Issue 23).
126. Stanton, Address in Favor of Universal Suffrage 13 (Albany 1867)'.
127. For example, see E. STANToN, supra note 13, at 231; STANToN & ANTHO.NY, supra note
4, at 129.
128. Resolution passed, recorded in Proceedings, supra note 120, at 52.
129. Memorial of Elizabeth Cady Stanton ...to the Congress of the United States (1872)*.
Although this position represented the moral high ground, in practice liberals wcrc wishy-washy
on suffrage qualifications. women often reiterated the argument, a staple of Sumner's theory, that
unacceptable qualifications could be distinguished by their immutability; i.e., youth and insanity
could be overcome, but sex and race never could be, leaving the door open to some restrictions. In
fact, Stanton went back and forth on the question of educational qualifications for suffrage and
often expressed her feelings about ignorant foreign-born rabble by supporting such a conditional
suffrage. See Educated Suffrage, The Independent (Feb. 14, 1895), collected In Stanton Papers,
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qualifications which a State may require of electors must be such as
can be acquired by all persons by the same means."130
The nineteenth-century, liberal, feminist, natural rights tradition
transfigured its eighteenth-century parent. The earlier tradition rooted
its theory of natural rights in the civil self; focusing political demands
on the right to vote, represent, legislate-to be independent in the polit-
ical sphere-automatically defined rights in such a way as to exclude
women who did not inhabit that world. In feminist eyes, natural rights
derived from natural laws and from the physical conditions of life com-
mon to pygmies and giants alike.13' Those who could claim to own
nothing but their souls were rich in natural rights.
V. THE ANTINOMIAN STATE
Elizabeth Cady Stanton's extreme individualist orientation made it
very difficult for her at any stage in her career to develop a substantive
theory of the state, or a theory of class action within the state. Her
religious and political antinomianism were inseparable, as expressed by
one of her favorite phrases, "a law unto herself." Both depended on the
ideal of the individual consulting his or her own conscience in rigorous
Protestant, republican fashion for the final ruling on the law. 32 Stanton
was hostile to law within the family setting, but concern for the individ-
ual's privacy was only one part of her disaffection with legal means.
Stanton felt strongly that, in any setting, public or private, the imposi-
tion of external norms was doomed to fail, a belief she shared with
Fourier and his followers.
One commentator, writing in the Revolution about marriage, sug-
gests that "the morality which consists in doing no harm . . . can be
enforced by external restraints, [but] is essentially different from the
morality which consists in loving God, and which is acquired by faith
supra note 5 (Reel 2). On the basis of Stanton's original claims to self-ownership, however, it is
difficult to make the argument that any sentient being of any age or condition can be denied the
vote; and, in fact, the basis of the regulatory authority over children and other dependents have
sometimes proven difficult or impossible for courts to uphold in the years since.
130. Woodhull, A Lecture on Constitutional Equality, in THE VICTORIA WOODHULL READER,
supra note 30, at 23 (given in New York in 1871).
131. The revolutionary natural rights tradition itself was a departure from the medieval natu-
ral laws tradition as taught by Thomas Aquinas and others, which looked to the habits of physical
life to determine natural laws.
132. Stanton used the term republican often and approvingly; republican as she defined it had
nothing to do with common good, but was synonymous with "self-governing." As such, she felt she
was moving the country in the direction of a true republic by endorsing individualism and would
have been horrified at the recent academic construction of republicanism.
[Vol. 21:905
ELIZABETH CADY STANTON
and prayer alone."133 These two categories approximated Stanton's di-
vision of tasks performed by the state and by the individual; the state
could be entrusted to do a small number of things in a limited way
under strict scrutiny, usually negative rather than positive action, while
all that was creative, vital, loving, constructive could only be under-
taken through the free will of the individual. Ultimately, the state (as
represented by the pedestrian bureaucrat, Recorder Hackett) would
wither away, and humans would be fully self-regulating.1 3
Such skepticism about positive law's capacity had several sources,
and it was particularly acute in liberal reform circles. Divine authority
still always trumped human authority. Conservatives like Greeley were
willing to dishonor human law if it conflicted with the overriding au-
thority of God's laws on the permanence of marriage, while Stanton
argued divine jurisdiction to refute the legislature's authority to enact
restrictive marriage laws. A variation on the theme of divine over
human authority was the ease with which reformers, particularly those
influenced by abolitionism, interpreted the exercise of human authority
as illegitimate and corrupt. 135 Finally, the influence of Fourierism, bol-
stered with arguments from liberal economic theory, combined with
liberal Protestantism's continuing strong belief in natural laws of divine
origin to create a widespread confidence in an all-encompassing system,
not the invention of mankind, but "deduced from and based upon uni-
versal Principles, [which] is the application to the social relations of
Mankind of the laws of Order and Unity, which govern the Uni-
verse."136 Stanton was a true believer in a universal set of laws, "immu-
table in the moral as in the material world" that governed individuals
by themselves and also in their social relations; one infringement could
"breed disorder and confusion in the whole social system."1 37 One of
the most important tenets of the day, with implications for public atti-
tudes toward the legal system, was that the activation of this self-regu-
133. 3 Revolution 117 (Feb. 25, 1869) (Issue 8).
134. On Labor and Free Love, supra note 63, at 266.
135. For the antebellum roots of this attitude in abolitionism, see L PERRY. RADICAL Aaou-
TIONiSM: ANARCHY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD IN ANTI SLAVERY TiouGrr (1973).
136. A. BRISBANE, supra note 84, at 3; see also Bestor, Albert Brisbane: Propagandist for
Socialism in the 1840s, 28 N. Y. Hisr. 128 (1949). Shively, Introduction to LOVE, MARRIAGE.
AND DIVORCE, supra note 107. Victoria Woodhull urges faith in the "self-regulating cfficacy of
freedom." Woodhull, Principles of Social Freedom, in THE VICTORIA WOODuLtU.. READER, supra
note 30, at 40.
137. Stanton, The Pleasures of Age: An Address Delivered by Elizabeth Cady Stanton on
Her Seventieth Birthday (n.p., n.d.)*; Stanton, supra note 126, at 13. Needless to say, Recorder
Hackett was not the author of these laws.
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lating system "proceeded by the liberation of inner resources rather
than the imposition of external form. ' 138 In their universal belief in a
grand social order regulated by natural laws lately come from the pres-
ence of God, most reformers repudiated the idea that human laws, act-
ing from without, could mold or coerce human behavior. Andrews
spoke for many in his assertion that marriage is a "contrivance [ ]to
regulate nature instead of studying her laws," and that "order, combin-
ing with freedom and ultimating in harmony, is to be the work of sci-
ence, and not of arbitrary legislation and criminal codes."139 Stanton
stressed that the task was not to rule others, but the much more diffi-
cult one of ruling oneself, and that it was the duty of women to own
and control themselves through government, not others.
140
Such attitudes toward regulation proved a shifting foundation on
which to build any theory of the state. In their dislike of the state,
liberal feminists had many plans for hobbling it. Its limited functions
were defined primarily as the protection of the weak and the protection
of personal rights; they were emphatic that any enacted law that con-
tradicted those purposes was not binding and was unconstitutional as
well.141
Paradoxically, though, the NWSA had based its agenda on a pro-
gram of national suffrage, rather than on a state by state basis. Stan-
ton's fear and dislike of the state were greater than most of her col-
leagues in the NWSA. Perhaps the more common attitude toward the
state was represented by Matilda Gage, who believed that the centrali-
zation of government in the United States had marked an increase,
rather than a decrease in liberty, and found the idea that states had
jurisdiction to define the individual's natural rights to be dangerous.14 2
138. H. FEINSTEIN. BECOMING WILLIAM JAMES 83 (1984).
139. LOVE, MARRIAGE, AND DIVORCE, supra note 107, at 49. Many of these attitudes sound
more like pre-Civil War anti-institutionalism of the kind George Fredrickson writes about in TIlE
INNER CIVIL WAR: NORTHERN INTELLECTUALS AND THE CRISIS OF THE UNION (1968) than like
his description of post-war life. The generation of reformers I am concerned with here came of
intellectual age in antebellum America and never lost the turn of mind they acquired then.
140. Stanton, supra note 5; see also I Revolution 69 (Feb. 5, 1868) (Issue 5).
141. Woodhull, supra note 30, at 8; see also 2 Revolution 169 (Sept. 17, 1868) (Issue 11)
(suggesting that the proper role of government is not to protect the weak, but to provide them
with the means whereby they can protect themselves). In 1894, Stanton made a strong push for
leaving family regulation to the state, so that "we can judge of the working of different laws under
varying circumstances, and thus learn their comparative merits." Actually it was an attempt to
stave off a proposed national anti-divorce bill then riding a wave of popularity. E. STANTON, supra
note 13, at 228.
142. M. GAGE, ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF... A SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT. . . 1880, at 10
(n.d.)*. Gage suggests here that questions such as placement of cemeteries and bridges should be
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Theory aside, Stanton and Gage had a political movement to run and
operated on the strategic hope that centralized government could pro-
tect women's rights. Both women see-sawed between anti-statism and
hope for a woman suffrage amendment, Stanton coming down more
often on the anti-statist side.
One area where Stanton fought in a sense to augment the jurisdic-
tion of the state was family relations. In destroying the basis of private
authority, Stanton thrust sexual and family matters into the public
sphere, one which included both men and women. She was emphatic
that cases of infanticide and sexual misconduct brought against women
should be tried by a jury of female peers, and that abuse within the
family should be brought out from behind the shield of the single-fam-
ily household and into open court. Dwelling on the details of one pa-
thetic infanticide-seduction, unwed pregnancy, desertion, prolonged
puerperal fever--Stanton over and over presented the details of
women's physical lives to public forums, as she also did repeatedly with
her lyceum lectures on marriage, divorce, and on motherhood as
well.14 3 Oppression flourished within an atmosphere of secrecy, privacy,
and closed doors; the body itself and all its workings must be revealed
and removed from the confining influences of the church and family."4
At the same time, Stanton mapped out the sphere of personal life
in public, only to label it private, and sought to enforce privacy rights
for individual behavior while destroying the privacy of the home. Self-
ownership's essential characteristic was that the individual served as
the sole judge of his own needs-a "man's wants make his rights.""4
Clearly rights based on such a criterion--one that exalts the subjective
judgment of the wanter over any external decision making
process-sets a standard that is unreviewable by any outsider or insti-
tutional authority. Because so much of politics for Stanton consisted of
issues of individual autonomy, huge areas of decisionmaking fell into
the preserve of individual sovereignty. Stanton sought to label much
behavior "private" or "personal" in a way that defined it as outside the
regulatory sphere and only within the competence of the individual.
left solely to local powers; in such matters, women "believe in the difrusion of the power of govern-
ment" and seek a return of control to local institutions. Id.
143. 2 Revolution 393 (Dec. 24, 1868) (Issue 25); 2 Revolution 358, 360 (Dec. 10, 1868)
(Issue 23).
144. See V. LEACH, supra note 62; see also J. COwAN. SCIENCE OF A NEW LIFE (1874 &
reprint 1970).
145. Letter from Elizabeth C. Stanton to Susan B. Anthony (July 14, 1858), collected in
Stanton Papers, supra note 3.
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Such a subjective standard-literally "my body, my right"-is open to
unilateral change at any time, with no basis for discussion or dispute.14
The dualism of radical associationism stayed with Stanton all her
life-no half measures, one was white or black, slave or free, a slave of
government or an individual sovereign. Because her final question was
always whether the individual was paramount, it was very difficult for
Stanton to develop any workable theory of a public interest or any posi-
tive theory of the state.Y47 Stanton may not have fully foreseen the con-
sequences of her theory of the dwarf state, nor have adequately consid-
ered the question of whether in fact a central government was a
necessary partner in ensuring women's equality.
The vision of citizenship and suffrage Stanton put forward was im-
poverished in the same way as her view of the state. Stanton's articu-
lated definition of the ballot was extremely narrow, almost never going
beyond its protective function. "[T]he right to protect one's person and
property; to govern one's self; to have a voice in the law and rulers; to
enjoy all the advantages and opportunities of which one is capable.
This is citizenship in a republic. The natural right to life, liberty, and
happiness.148 This position is in many ways a retreat from antebellum
feminism, which fully subscribed to political rights as enhancing the
development of the individual, but tied them also to the performance of
duties and the provision of goods and services for all. The vote for ante-
bellum feminists was tied into a web of relationships often described in
the phrase "rights and duties." Stanton categorically rejected condi-
tioning one's rights on one's duties, or on anything but self-ownership.
She was not without a broader vision of the potential for human devel-
opment; in fact, this was her creed and her religion. But her individual-
istic stance left little room for a positive view of government or for its
146. In the arguments in front of the Supreme Court in the Webster abortion-rights case in
April 1989, the attorney for the plaintiffs was quoted as saying, "IT]he conclusion ... is when
you have an issue so divisive and so emotional and so personal and so intimate, that it must be left
as a fundamental right to an individual to make that choice." N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1989, at I,
col. 6. This conclusion is striking both because it is such a complete reversal of eighteenth-ccntury
thought, where a decision "so emotional and so personal" would have been described as "so moral
and so religious" and, exactly for that reason, subject to regulation of some kind; and because it
seems a direct descendant of the argument Stanton set up initially, that sexual and family matters
were "personal" and not moral, and therefore impervious to public scrutiny.
147. Stanton calls the idea that the interests of society are paramount to those of the individ-
ual the "Roman idea, the Pagan idea, that the individual was made for the State." E. STANTON,
supra note 13, at 231.
148. Stanton, Women Do Not Wish to Vote, 2 NAT'L BULL. (Apr. 1894) (Issue 3), collected
in Stanton Papers, supra note 5 (Reel 2).
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potential to act as a force for good in people's lives-or for politics as
an institution in which people come together to govern themselves
jointly.
Nor did it allow for any real theory of economic class, or class
action within the state.149 Far more than her peers, Stanton understood
women as a sex-class, joined in oppression, but any real sense of eco-
nomic class eluded her; her sympathy for slaves and workers was al-
ways strained. 150 All her life, Stanton retained a conviction formed in
the America of the Second Great Awakening, that civil perfection is
gained in the perfection of individuals and their rights; denying argu-
ments from "the rights of races," she demanded an "end to all this talk
of class legislation, bury the negro in the citizen."1511 The identification
of a common interest perhaps necessary for class consciousness was
lacking in Stanton, who believed that "[n]o mortal has ever been, no
mortal will ever be like the soul just launched on the sea of life."' 52
The liberal Protestant notion of the individual, the primacy of individ-
ual conscience, worked against the possibility of mutual interests as
well. Indeed, class could be an oppressive structure, one that blurred
the outlines of personhood in the group, or dictated wants and needs.
Stanton's class theory failed in part because she had no conception of
potential conflict between the individual and the state. Fourier's univer-
sal harmonies worked to assure that the highest good of society and the
individual always lay in the same direction: that if you "take care of
individual rights the nation will take care of itself."1lea Perhaps in this
149. Toward the very end of her life, Stanton began to come to terms with some of the limita-
tions of her philosophy, to appreciate the possibilities of some type of socialism, and to speak more
realistically about the reality of class conflict in an industrial society. See. e.g., Stanton, supra
note 42, at 3-4. In another letter, undated but written from Basingstoke, England. sometime in the
1890s, she writes in an uncharacteristic moment of doubt, "My mind is not clear yet on the
subject of paternal government, whether we have too much or too little." Letter from Elizabeth C.
Stanton to Elizabeth S. Miller (n.d.), collected in Stanton Papers, supra note 3.
150. Gail Parker, in the Introduction to E. STANTON, supra note 13. at xviii (reprint 1971).
says
I cannot help but wish that she had manifested a less invidious sisterly love for her sex
and that her championship of the slaves, and later of the working classes, had been
marked by a genuine feeling of involvement with their fate, instead of a vicarious plea-
sure in being able to share in their rebellious feelings. Elizabeth Stanton was never going
to be caught depending on someone else's revolution.
Id.
151. For the influence of revivalism on Stanton, see A. Rossi. Introduction to ThtE F0,1tNIsT
PAPERS Pt. 11 (1974); 3 Revolution 25 (Jan. 14, 1869) (Issue 2).
152. Solitude of Self, supra note 35, at 2.
153. On Labor and Free Love, supra note 63, at 2; STANTON & ANTioNY, supra note 4, at
129; E. STANTON, supra note 13, at 231.
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seeming harmony the chance to transform the idea of natural rights as
rooted in physical being into economic rights was lost.
CONCLUSION
Stanton's political philosophy and view of natural rights had a
great influence on feminism. And feminism, as well as women's entry
into the public sphere, helped to transform liberalism. In the eighteenth
century, the liberal individual (male) was defined by owning property,
voting, participating in the public sphere. By the end of the nineteenth,
there was a consensus, if not on the details, at least on the fact that the
liberal individual, male or female, was autonomous in personal life, as
well and that rights extended to privacy of the body, freedom from
physical coercion. 154 Commentators on Stanton have suggested that,
over the span of her career, she moved away from an early interest in
legal and political reform, switching in the late 1860s and 1870s to
more intimate concerns of marriage, sexuality, maternity, and finally,
in her last twenty years, to religion and the church. 155 Although her
interest in all these questions was lifelong, her focus on sexual and fam-
ily concerns certainly intensified during the 1870s. At the core of her
transitions, though, is continuity and not change. In mainstream politi-
cal debate the explicit natural rights language of bodily ownership
peaked in the 1870s, losing its force after the end of Reconstruction.
154. Of course the causal question, which I have begged here, is how much liberalism changed
as a result of any of the campaigns of organized feminism, or as a result of the entry of women
into the political sphere, an established fact by the later nineteenth century, E. STANTON, supra
note 13, at 265, or as a result of the other great movement for freedom of the body, anti-slavery
and Reconstruction; or as a result of gendered division of labor whereby women needed rights in
order to fulfill sole duties within the home (although this seems not to explain the emphasis on
bodily autonomy). But see M. GROSSBERG, supra note II (or as a result of the body, anti-slavery
and Reconstruction); S. LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG: STATUS AND CULTURE IN A
SOUTHERN TOWN, 1784-1860 (1984); Chused, Married Women's Property Law, 1800-1850, 71
GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983). Rejecting monocausal history, I think all were important and am not
focusing on liberal political theory to suggest that other developments were not. At the same time
I do think, unlike some commentators, that organized liberal feminism was highly visible and
influential in defining the questions in post-Civil War America; the tremendous publicity given to
them in newspapers, their incessant lecture tours, their constant stream of publications, all helped
to redefine the liberal individual.
155. See M. Fitzgerald, Religion in the Life and Thought of Elizabeth Cady Stanton chs. 4 &
5 (1985) (unpublished manuscript) (University of Wisconsin, M.A. thesis); STANTON &
ANTHONY, supra note 4, at 94; see also W. LEACH, supra note 62, at 143 (who also suggests that
after the Civil War Stanton's preoccupation with individualism gave way to an attempt to "com-
bine individualism with structure, organization, and centralization"). Stanton does indicate that
she knows these possibilities exist in her last years, but I question the extent to which she ever
effectively moved away from individualism in her political theory.
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But the language of autonomy lived on in Stanton's work, and lay at
the core both of her work on the domestic question and the religion
question. For the whole of her career from first to last, the concept of
self-ownership was at the root of Stanton's political thought; its protec-
tion the ultimate goal of any form of government or social
arrangement.

